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Abstract
More than 30 years after the ﬁrst major aircraft encounters with volcanic
ash over Indonesia in 1982, it remains challenging to inform aircraft in
flight of the exact location of potentially dangerous ash clouds on their
flight path, particularly shortly after the eruption has occurred. The
difﬁculties include reliably forecasting and detecting the onset of
signiﬁcant explosive eruptions on a global basis, observing the dispersal
of eruption clouds in real time, capturing their complex structure and
constituents in atmospheric transport models, describing these observa-
tions and modelling results in a manner suitable for aviation users,
delivering timely warning messages to the cockpit, flight planners and air
trafﬁc management systems, and the need for scientiﬁc development in
order to undertake operational enhancements. The framework under which
these issues are managed is the International Airways Volcano Watch
(IAVW), administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). ICAO outlines in its standards and recommended practices
(International Civil Aviation Organization 2014a, b) the basic volcanic
monitoring and communication that is necessary at volcano observatories
in Member States (countries). However, not all volcanoes are monitored
and not all countries with volcanoes have mandated volcano observatories
or equivalents. To add to the efforts of volcano observatories, a system of
Meteorological Watch Ofﬁces, Air Trafﬁc Management Area Control
Centres, and nine specialist Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) are
P. Lechner (&)




Australian Bureau of Meteorology, Melbourne,
Australia
e-mail: a.tupper@bom.gov.au
M. Guffanti  T. Casadevall









© The Author(s) 2017
1
responsible for observing, analysing, forecasting and communicating the
aviation hazard (airborne ash), using agreed techniques and messages in
deﬁned formats. Continuous improvement of the IAVW framework is
overseen by expert groups representing the operators of the system, the
user community, and the science community. The IAVW represents a
unique marriage of two scientiﬁc disciplines, volcanology and meteorol-
ogy, with the aviation user community. There have been many
multifaceted volcanic eruptions in complex meteorological conditions
during the history of the IAVW. Each new eruption brings new insights
into how the warning system can be improved, and each reinforces the
lessons that have gone before. The management of these events has
improved greatly since the major ash encounters in the 1980s, but
discontinuities in the warning and communications system still occur.
A good example is a 2014 ash encounter over Indonesia following the
eruption of Kelut where the warnings did not reach the aircraft crew. Other
events present enormous management challenges—for example the 2010
Eyjafjallajökull eruption in Iceland was, overall, less hazardous than many
less publicised eruptions, but numerous small to moderate explosions over
several weeks produced widespread disruption and a large economic
impact. At the time of writing, while there has been hundreds of millions
of US dollars in damage to aircraft from encounters with ash, there have
been no fatalities resulting from aviation incidents in, or proximal to
volcanic ash cloud. This reflects, at least in part, the hard work done in
putting together a global warning system—although to some extent it also
reflects a measure of good statistical fortune. In order to minimise the risk
of aircraft encounters with volcanic ash clouds, the global effort continues.
The future priorities for the IAVW are strongly focused on enhancing
communication before, and at the very onset of a volcanic ash-producing
event (typically the more dangerous stage), together with improved
downstream information and warning systems to help reduce the
economic impact of eruptions on aviation.
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1 Introduction
Since the advent of the jet age in the 1960s, there
has been a signiﬁcant and continuing growth in
air travel with ever increasing densities of high
technology aircraft in limited available civil air-
space. Over the same period, the correspondingly
increased probability and potentially dire
consequence of aircraft encounters with volcanic
clouds has become clearly apparent.
Damage to aircraft from volcanic ash cloud
encounters can be immediate and long term
(Casadevall 1993). As aerospace technology
develops, jet-turbine running temperatures have
increased markedly seeking increasing thrust and
economy. Modern high-bypass jet-turbine
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engines run at temperatures in excess of the
melting point of many minerals and silicates.
Similarly, the ﬁne tolerances of airframe fabri-
cation, and electrical, hydraulic, and navigation
systems can all be compromised by the nature,
density, and size of volcanic ash particles. The
accretion of volcanic ash silicates on turbine
engine blades can, and has, resulted in engine
stalling and inability to restart. The accretion or
incidence of volcanic ash silicates on and in the
airframe can lead to critical interruption of elec-
trical and hydraulic aircraft systems. Even mar-
ginal encounters with low density volcanic ash
cloud results in accelerated wear and tear on
aircraft and engines (International Civil Aviation
Organization 2007, Manual on Volcanic Ash,
Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical
Clouds, Doc 9691). Any aircraft encounter with a
volcanic ash cloud therefore carries both a safety
and an economic consequence.
From 1953 to 2009, there have been over 129
reported incidents of aircraft encountering vol-
canic ash (Guffanti et al. 2010); 79 of these
resulted in some physical damage to the aircraft.
Of these damaging encounters, 26 can be
considered severe, including nine incidents that
resulted in loss of in-flight power in one or more
engines. Some of the latter have been widely
documented, such as the ﬁrst “all engines out”
encounter by a Boeing B747 in 1982 with ash
near Indonesia from Galunggung volcano, and
the Boeing B747 encounter in 1989 with ash
from Redoubt volcano over Alaska (Miller and
Casadevall 2000). In contrast some encounters
have received little public attention, such as an
all-engines failure in a Gulfstream II survey air-
craft in 2006 over Papua New Guinea due to an
encounter with ash from Manam volcano (Tup-
per et al. 2007a, b).
From 1953 to 2014, eruptions from 40 vol-
canoes located in 16 countries have caused
damaging encounters of aircraft with ash clouds
(Fig. 1). While the most damaging encounters
have occurred within 24 h of eruption onset
and/or within 1000 km of the source, less
safety-signiﬁcant but still economically damag-
ing encounters have occurred at greater distances
and extended times (Guffanti et al. 2010).
The potential risk arising from such encounters
has often been highlighted by the international
Fig. 1 Map of source volcanoes responsible for damaging encounters of aircraft with ash clouds (modiﬁed from
Table 7 of Guffanti et al. 2010)
Volcanic Ash and Aviation—The Challenges … 3
civil aviation community as a priority area in need
of systematic global mitigation and further
development of risk reduction measures (Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization 2012).
2 International Airways Volcano
Watch
In response to the demand for globally
co-ordinated mitigation of the volcanic ash risks
to aviation, the IAVW was established in 1987
by ICAO in close co-ordination with the World
Meteorological Organization. Since that time a
collaborative approach, led by the IAVW, has
matured into a comprehensive worldwide moni-
toring and notiﬁcation system (International Civil
Aviation Organization 2014a, b).
The IAVW system is an operational pro-
gramme binding on all ICAO member States
(countries) through the Chicago Convention.1
The system is made up of three main components:
1. Observing component—this comprises exist-
ing international ground-based monitoring
and observations (including VONA—Vol-
cano Observatory Notice for Aviation), global
satellite based detection and in-flight air
reports (VAR—volcanic ash reports) to
observe/detect volcanic eruptions and ash
clouds and pass the information quickly to
appropriate Air Trafﬁc Management Area
Control Centres, Meteorological Watch Ofﬁ-
ces, and VAACs.
2. Advisory component—this comprises the
production of advisory products by the
VAACs for use by Meteorological Watch
Ofﬁces and air trafﬁc management Area
Control Centres. The Volcanic Ash Advisory
(VAA) message and its graphical equivalent
(VAG) contain information on the position
and current eruptive state of the volcano, the
current and expected position of any
associated volcanic ash cloud, along with
relevant contextual information on plume
height, observation sources and expectation
for the timing of next issue.
3. Warning component—this provides the nec-
essary warnings to aircraft and air trafﬁc
management through two types of messages:
SIGniﬁcant METeorological information
about aviation weather hazards (SIGMETs)
that are issued by Meteorological Watch
Ofﬁces, and NOTices to Air Men (NOTAMs)
for changes in airspace status that are issued
by Area Control Centres.
The SIGMETs and NOTAMs are based on
advisory information supplied by nine designated
VAACs, whose aggregate areas of responsibility
cover most of the globe. TheVAACs in the IAVW
system are: Anchorage, Buenos Aires, Darwin,
London,Montreal, Tokyo, Toulouse, Washington
and Wellington. The approximate VAAC areas of
responsibility are shown in Fig. 2.
IAVW services can also be categorised in four
areas: (1) monitoring information on the threat,
onset, cessation, scale and characteristics of an
eruption, (2) monitoring the volcanic ash in the
atmosphere, (3) forecasting the expected trajec-
tory and location of the ash cloud, and (4) com-
municating the information to the users.
Essentially, the success of the IAVW system is
entirely dependent on requisite information
gathering, analyses and prediction, targeted dis-
semination of information, and the procedural or
automatic application of that information.
Before and during a volcanic eruption, the
co-ordination and flow of information regarding
the (potential) eruption, and the location and
forecast position of the volcanic ash cloud is the
primary concern. It involves co-operation among
all information providers, and between informa-
tion providers and operational decision makers.
Such co-ordination and co-operation requires
planning and preparation before an eruption. The
primary providers of information include Mete-
orological Watch Ofﬁces, VAACs, volcano
observatories, and aircraft in flight, supplemented
by information from the research and broader
communities.
1The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
was signed in 1944. Standards and procedures for safe
and economic international aviation are set out in detail in
19 Annexes to the Convention.
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Users of information (operational decision
makers) are Air Trafﬁc Management Systems
including Aeronautical Information Services, Air
Trafﬁc Control, and Air Trafﬁc Flow Manage-
ment, private and commercial flight crews, and
airline operations centres. Regulatory
co-operation between civil aviation authorities
and aircraft operators using the information
provided is essential for support of the pre-flight
planning process, and the in-flight and post-flight
decision-making processes; all as part of overall
safety risk mitigation.2
The lines of communication and responsibility
in the IAVW are shown in Fig. 3.
3 Volcano Monitoring
Volcano observatories are loosely organised
under the banner of the World Organization of
Volcano Observatories, a commission of the
International Association of Volcanology and the
Earth’s Interior, itself a member association of
the International Union of Geodesy and Geo-
physics. Not all volcanoes are monitored and not
all countries have volcano observatories.
Volcano observatory staff can detect volcanic
unrest, provide eruption forecasts, identify the
onset of an eruption, and advise on the evolution
and end of an eruption. Ideally these volcano
observatories provide guidance on the changing
eruption characteristics through time such as
plume heights, altitudes of dispersing ash layers
in the atmosphere, likely particle size distribution
(post initial eruption) and possible mass eruption
rates that can be used in numerical dispersion and
transport models. Many observatories may anal-
yse eruption products providing information on
composition of ash and also gas emissions that
impact on aircraft systems. Volcano observato-
ries typically also hold information on past
eruptions of a given volcano so they are able to
provide likely eruption scenarios and a range of
likely eruption parameters, such as possible ash
ejection heights, before an eruption occurs. They
are also responsible for monitoring ground haz-
ards such as ash fall and volcanic gas dispersal.
Volcano observatories build long-term rela-
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Fig. 2 Areas of responsibility of the nine volcanic ash advisory centres
2Refer to; ICAO Doc 9974 Flight Safety and Volcanic
Ash.
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organisations, local and national authorities, and
communities that live around volcanoes. Rela-
tionships between VAACs and Meteorological
Watch Ofﬁces are similarly long-term and strong,
given that many observatories run weather sta-
tions and have strong links with local meteorol-
ogists due to the need to forecast rain-induced
lahars (volcanic mud flows), volcanic ash, and
gas dispersal. The ascent of magma towards the
Earth’s surface before an eruption typically
generates physical signals that can be detected if
appropriate volcano monitoring is in place,
thereby allowing eruption forecasting and early
warning. Pre-eruptive signals (volcanic unrest)
may be detected using a variety of methods,
including, but not limited to: volcanic earthquake
monitoring using seismometers, ground
deformation measurements and observations of
hydrologic activity change, gas emissions change
monitoring, and steam explosion observations.
The status activity of a volcano is best com-
municated in a succinct manner to inform deci-
sion makers. To assist with this, the international
aviation community has established a four-level
colour code chart for quick reference to indicate
the general state of a given volcano (Table 1).
The colour code identiﬁes the state of the volcano
(i.e. unrest vs. eruption) but is not intended to
represent the status of distal ash in the atmosphere
(Guffanti and Miller 2013) or to represent risk to
aviation or to people and assets on the ground.
While the international community has
developed the colour-code system, it should be
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Fig. 3 IAVW system elements and relationships
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not assigned to all volcanoes. While an interna-
tional standard, the colour code is currently only
formally used by the United States, Russia, New
Zealand, and Iceland. The reasons for this vary,
but most States not using the colour code indicate
difﬁculties in using international systems in par-
allel with their own locally accepted and appro-
priate alert levels for ground hazards. It is also
recognised that different colours are associated
with adverse situations in different cultures and
ethnicities.
In 2008, the IAVW Operations Group intro-
duced a new message format to assist volcanol-
ogists in the timely provision of information on
the state of a volcano to support the issue of
volcanic ash advisories by VAACs, the issue of
SIGMET information by Meteorological Watch
Ofﬁces, and the issue of NOTAM for volcanic
ash by Air Trafﬁc (Control) Services. This
especially formatted message is referred to as
Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation or
VONA (International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion 2014a, b). The VONA (or something similar
based on discussion and agreement on a case by
case basis between the speciﬁc agencies
involved) is expected to be issued by an obser-
vatory when the aviation colour code changes
(up or down) or within a colour code level when
an ash producing event or other signiﬁcant
change in volcanic behaviour occurs. Two-way
discussions are essential between volcano
observatories and aviation information providers
about the observations and information needed
during eruption, formats required, challenges and
limitations, as well as an explanation as to how
the information will be used and who will receive
outputs. For example, the Icelandic Met Ofﬁce
(Iceland’s volcano observatory) and the UK Met
Ofﬁce (through the London VAAC) have estab-
lished a speciﬁc format co-designed to suit vol-
cano observatory operating capacities, VAAC
needs, and reflect joint experience (Webster et al.
2012). The VONA is a good starting point for
such discussions.
4 The Challenges
Introducing and continually improving high tech-
nology systems to mitigate safety and economic
risk from natural events inevitably bring great
challenges. For the volcanic risk to aviation these
challenges include the detection of volcanic ash
cloud, forecasting its dispersion, and the timely and
targeted communication of this information, along




Today’s volcanic ash cloud forecasts, provided
by the VAACs, are basic textual and graphical
information produced using the output from
atmospheric dispersion and transport models.
Most of the numerical ash dispersal forecast
models utilised by VAACs comprise a
Table 1 ICAO Aviation Colour-Code
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meteorological model including wind speed and
direction, into which volcanic ash is introduced
specifying input parameters related to the vol-
canic source (Eruption Source Parameters).
Eruption Source Parameters may include vent
location, plume height, eruption duration or
start/stop time, mass eruption rate, particle size
distribution, vertical distribution of mass with
height above the vent and distal ﬁne ash fraction
(Mastin et al. 2009). Uncertainty in any of the
various source parameters can result in large
errors in the resultant volcanic ash cloud fore-
casts (Webster et al. 2012). Sensitivity analysis
can identify the most critical parameters and
demonstrate the range of outcomes under differ-
ent conditions of uncertainty.
Meteorological forecasters evaluate the model
outputs before issuing and during the validity of
VAA messages. That analysis includes real-time
veriﬁcation of the ash cloud model output against
a range of observational resources, principally
remote sensing by satellite but also including
reports from aircraft and increasingly ground-
based sensing such as LIDAR. Post-eruption,
model predictions in the distal environment can be
compared with observational datasets to examine
overall model performance (e.g. Webster et al.
2012).
The current two primary volcanic ash forecast
products are the VAA and the SIGMET. The
VAACs provide VAA in a text and graphic-based
format (VAG) that sets out an analysis of the
current position of the ash cloud, and a six, 12 and
18-h forecast location of the ash cloud, setting out
position, altitude and thickness using aviation
flight level nomenclature. Work has been under-
taken informally at each VAAC to provide fore-
cast location of ash cloud out to 24 h. This may
become a standard time-step in the future. Mete-
orological Watch Ofﬁces issue volcanic ash cloud
SIGMETs based on the guidance provided by the
associated VAAC in their respective VAA and
VAG products. These SIGMETs are valid for up
to 6 h and describe the current and expected
location of the ash cloud within the Flight Infor-
mation Region or area of responsibility of the
Meteorological Watch Ofﬁces.
As a supplementary service, at time of writ-
ing, the European and North Atlantic regions use
forecast ash cloud concentration charts issued
alongside ofﬁcial VAAC products. Such charts,
depicting forecast ash concentration were ﬁrst
provided to users in April 2010 in response to the
Eyjafjallajökull volcanic event. It is important to
note that there are currently no globally agreed
standards and procedures for the production,
provision, and use of concentration charts (Guf-
fanti and Tupper 2015).
4.2 Communications
In elementary terms, the IAVW system is
required to provide volcanic ash cloud informa-
tion to airline operators and Air Trafﬁc Man-
agement system providers who then pass the
information to airline dispatchers and pilots.
Figure 3 depicts the information flow following a
volcanic eruption and identiﬁes participants in
the provision of volcanic ash cloud information.
In practice, and despite some excellent initia-
tives to improve it, communication can fail at any
stage. For many signiﬁcant aviation encounters,
aircraft crew members had no knowledge of the
eruption encountered despite it being evident to
people on the ground—this was the case recently
with an aircraft experiencing a damaging
encounter with ash from Kelut, Indonesia, 6 h
after the 13 February 2014 eruption (airline
sources, unpublished communication, 2014). The
worst known example occurred in 1991 when
there were at-least sixteen in-flight encounters
with volcanic ash from Pinatubo, in the Philip-
pines. These encounters occurred despite exten-
sive information being available. Casadevall et al.
(1996) noted that the response within the Philip-
pines was relatively effective, but the interna-
tional response was not, as summarised:
…information and warnings about the hazard of
volcanic ash either did not reach appropriate ofﬁ-
cials in time to prevent these encounters or that
those pilots, dispatchers, and air trafﬁc controllers
who received this information were not sufﬁciently
educated about the volcanic ash hazard to know
what steps to take to avoid ash clouds… the key to
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communicating information about volcanic erup-
tions in a timely and readily understandable form is
to involve all interested groups (geologists, mete-
orologists, pilots, and air trafﬁc controllers) in the
development of information and to streamline the
distribution of this information between essential
parties….
Other documented examples include the
Manam eruptions during 2004–05 in Papua New
Guinea where a large number of pilot reports of
volcanic activity collected in flight were not
passed on outside the airline involved, regardless
of international requirements (Tupper et al.
2007a, b). Conversations with the air trafﬁc
management community have also indicated that
air trafﬁc controllers are often too busy to pass on
messages that they believe have a lower priority
than managing the separation of aircraft (Tupper,
personal communication, 2014).
When communications are working well,
initial reports of volcanic ash can result in useful
information being delivered to the end user. In
most cases, information about a volcanic ash
cloud will be provided to the pilot, either in
flight, or during pre-flight planning, in the form
of SIGMETs, NOTAMs, reports from pilots, or
VAA/VAG. Each of these products is distinct in
format and content, but all can provide infor-
mation regarding the location of volcanic ash
cloud. It is critically evident that all of these
products must be consistent in their overall
message. When the situation is changing rapidly,
that can be extremely challenging.
The 18 August 2000 eruption of Miyakejima,
Japan, illustrated this point (Tupper 2012). At
least four non-Japanese aircraft encountered the
cloud, with two sustaining signiﬁcant damage.
The eruption was sudden, but there was very
strong awareness amongst domestic and some
foreign airlines of the potential for activity at the
volcano. The eruption was well observed, and the
speed of response by Japanese authorities was
exceptional. Nevertheless, there were some
minor communication issues at several stages in
the warning chain, resulting in inconsistencies in
the information available, particularly during the
rapidly developing early stages of the eruption.
To illustrate the potential differences of esti-
mated volcanic ash cloud height in various
real-time warnings, Fig. 4 sets out the ash cloud
heights stated in VAA, SIGMET, and NOTAM,
with respect to their issue time and validity,
against the post eruption evaluation of the
approximate real volcanic ash cloud height for
the 2000 Miyakejima event. The times and
approximate altitudes of four conﬁrmed aircraft
encounters with the cloud are shown. During the
critical ﬁrst half hour of the eruption, the VAA
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Post-eruption evaluation of the approximate real ash cloud height
Approximate time and altitude of reported aircraft encounter with volcanic ash cloud
Fig. 4 Schematic showing volcanic ash cloud height as set out in various real-time warnings along with approximate
real ash cloud height for the 2000 Miyakejima event, over approximate time after eruption. After Tupper et al. (2004)
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multiple, and in some cases time-lagged observa-
tions and information loops. The two early
encounters occurred before a concurrent height of
the eruption was reflected in the warnings. The
actualwarning responsewas relatively good for this
eruption, but the schematic illustrates the com-
plexity of messaging, in a fast changing environ-
ment, particularly with multiple warning types.
Getting the ofﬁcial communication for warn-
ings right can be made easier, but can also be
complicated by non-ofﬁcial communications. In
recent years, the rise of social media, enhanced
remote communications, and omnipresent digital
photography has meant that unofﬁcial eruption
and hazard notiﬁcations have become almost
expected. Operational centres can and do use this
to their advantage, particularly for early alerting.
However observers can be mistaken—for exam-
ple during the eruption at Bardarbunga Iceland in
2014 there were Twitter reports of an eruption ash
cloud based on web cam pictures but it was in fact
a dust storm from a nearby sandur plain. Another
downside is the amount of ‘chatter’ and the
potential for conflicting messaging. Nevertheless,
the necessity for public engagement during an
event has also risen. The relative level of safety
risk of events is also not necessarily reflected in
the attention that particular eruptions get in public.
As a result of the avalanche of non-ofﬁcial
communications during volcanic events, VAACs
and Meteorological Watch Ofﬁces endeavour to
authenticate all incoming information to establish
the reliability and weighting of such information.
For example, in 2010, earth scientists and atmo-
spheric scientists in Iceland and the UK enhanced
their relationships in a number of ways, including
through visits between operational institutions
(VAAC at theUKMetOfﬁce and Iceland’s volcano
observatory, the Icelandic Met Ofﬁce) to better
understandprocesses andworking practices used by
the other organisation. In parallel, civil protection
authorities in the UK sought information and advice
about impacts to the UK through UK national
research institutions, who in turn consulted Ice-
landic scientists including the Icelandic Met Ofﬁce.
In order to support both aviation and civil
protection sectors and to facilitate strategic sci-
ence, a memorandum of understanding was
established between the UK and Iceland to
facilitate the flow of information between nations,
and to enable wider management of the impacts
of cross-border hazards and co-ordination of
distal observations of volcanic ash cloud. This
memorandum of understanding now underpins
long-term productive cross-disciplinary research
and relationships. The Icelandic Met Ofﬁce with
the National Commissioner of Icelandic Police
(Iceland’s Civil Protection) continue to make a
great deal of data and information available in
close to real time during volcanic unrest and
eruptions (including that on social media) to
enhance communication across sectors.
4.3 Science Challenges
Operational enhancements will continue to need
wide scientiﬁc development work and expansion
of the understanding of the full volcanic ash
hazard and risk to aviation.
The central theme of scientiﬁc concern is how
to accurately determine the constituents (solid
particles, gases, and aerosols), density, and
three-dimensional shape of a volcanic cloud at
particular times and locations. Understanding
engine and airframe tolerances to ash ingestion
and gas effects will better inform the operational
risk management of airlines.
Reducing uncertainties in ash reporting and
plume modelling is expected to eventually provide
critical warning system enhancements in the future.
During volcanic eruptions, a number of toxic
gases may be emitted in addition to ash; these
include sulphur dioxide (SO2), hydrogen fluoride
(HF), and hydrogen sulphide (H2S) amongst many
others. Each of these gases has different atmospheric
dispersion properties, and so gas clouds may be
found coincident or separate from volcanic ash
clouds. Of these gases, SO2 is of particular impor-
tance as it may be emitted in large quantities and
potentially has signiﬁcant health effects, as well as
longer term effects on aircraft. Further engineering
and science work is needed to fully understand this
area and reflect any advances in the IAVW system.
In pursuing these objectives the aviation com-
munity has been well supported for many years by
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the science community, including the World
Meteorological Organization and the International
Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, member
associations, and many dedicated individuals.
Particular support in contributing to and
co-ordinating these scientiﬁc endeavours in sup-
port of the ICAO IAVW will continue to be pro-
vided by the WMO Sponsored Volcanic Ash
Advisory Group and VAAC Best Practices work-
shops. Supplementing this, the periodic WMO
sponsored volcanic ash science meeting is expec-
ted to provide the academic forum for reporting of
developments and scientiﬁc collaboration.
In supporting this growing area of work,
future science investment will be essential to
continue developing the IAVW.
5 Warning System Enhancements
The eruption of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull vol-
cano during March to May 2010 demonstrated
again the vulnerability of aviation to volcanic
eruptions. According to an analysis by Oxford
Economics (2015), more than 100,000 commer-
cial flights were cancelled during the Eyjafjal-
lajökull volcano eruptive phase, and US
$4.7 billion in global GDP was lost. The report
estimated the gross loss to airlines worldwide at
US$2.6 billion due to this single volcanic event.
Later, in 2010 and in response to the Eyjafjal-
lajökull episode (International Civil Aviation
Organization 2013a), ICAO established an Inter-
national Volcanic Ash Task Force as a multi-
disciplinary global group to further develop and
co-ordinate work related to volcanic ash. Before it
concluded its work in 2012, it addressed issues
related to air trafﬁc management, aircraft airwor-
thiness, aeronautical meteorology, and vol-
canological and atmospheric sciences. The Task
Force identiﬁed further work to be undertaken, by
existing bodies such as the IAVW Operations
Group and collaborative best practice development
amongst the nine VAACs, co-ordinated by the
WMO (Guffanti and Tupper 2015).
Also of signiﬁcance, over the last decade
ICAO has gradually developed and begun
implementing a Global Air Navigation Plan
(ICAO 2013b Doc 9750, 2013–2028) as an
overarching air navigation framework, including
key civil aviation policy principles to assist
regions and States with the preparation of their
Regional and State air navigation plans.
The objective of the Global Air Navigation
Plan is to increase airspace capacity and improve
efﬁciency of the global civil aviation system while
improving, or at least maintaining safety. The Plan
includes an upgrade framework, and guidelines
for associated technology development covering
communications, surveillance, navigation, infor-
mation management, meteorology and avionics.
The Plan reflects all of the science, communi-
cations and operational recommendations of the
International Volcanic Ash Task Force 4th
Table 2 Enhancement of Volcanic Ash Risk Mitigation—Excerpts from the ICAO Global Air Navigation Plan







Acceptable developments should take into
account the needs of all directly involved
Common views have been established on
the collaborative treatment of volcanic ash
cloud extending across different Flight
Information Regions and VAAC areas
Increase the provision of
Volcano Observatory
Notices to Aviation
Not all State Volcano Observatories are
issuing VONA
State Volcano Observatories have been
encouraged to issue the VONA. The
number of States doing so is increasing
Develop information
conﬁdence levels
This work responds to a request from the
International Air Transport Association
(IATA)
VAAC provider States are actively
developing conﬁdence level concepts from
both a science and operational standpoint
(continued)








A large volcanic ash cloud over congested,
multi-State areas can result in multiple
SIGMET information messages, all being
in effect at the same time
Work is underway better support MWO
responsibilities to issue SIGMET
Work is also underway to develop a
regional approach to the issue of SIGMET
Transition to all-digital
format
Volcanic cloud information needs to be
provided in a digital form to support
ingestion directly into flight planning and
flight management systems
A large area of work is under way as part
of the ICAO Meteorology Panel set of
projects to support the development of




frequency and time steps
Operators need frequent updates of
volcanic ash information especially in
congested airspace and around constrained
airports
Dynamic provision of forecast data is being





Reliable and granular observation of
meteorological phenomena including
volcanic ash is pivotal in improving
forecast products
The expansion of ground-based networks,
satellite platforms and sensors, and





Aircraft operating at up to 1000 km/h need
to know the current location of a volcanic
ash cloud at any given time
It is expected that a three-dimensional
representation of the current or near-current
volcanic ash boundaries could eventually




Current volcanic ash forecasts are
deterministic forecasts. They are a yes/no
forecast, with respect to the depiction of the
airspace impacted by discerniblea volcanic
ash
Probabilistic forecasts will provide
decision makers with an assessment of all
the likelihoods of risk of occurrence




There is a need to expand the warning
services to other toxic emissions from
volcanic eruptions
This issue is currently being studied by
both ICAO and WMO experts
Trajectory based
operations
Integration of volcanic cloud now-casts
and forecasts, combined with the use of
probabilistic forecasts to address
uncertainty, is expected to signiﬁcantly
reduce the effects of volcanic cloud on air
trafﬁc flow
The meteorological and air trafﬁc
management communities are starting to
work more closely on this objective
Development of Index
levels for aircraft ash
tolerances
Aircraft operators increasingly need
quantitative volcanic ash forecasts to take
advantage of yet to be speciﬁed aircraft and
engine limits.
The development of a volcanic ash index
for ash/gas tolerances of various types of
engine/aircraft combinations is in the very




A few basic systems to alert pilots to the
distal presence of volcanic ash are under
evaluation
To allow operators to take advantage of
tactical on-board volcanic ash detection
equipment, new air trafﬁc management
processes will need to be developed
aDiscernible ash is deﬁned as “volcanic ash detected by deﬁned impacts on/in aircraft or by agreed in-situ and/or
remote-sensing techniques”; Visible ash is deﬁned as “volcanic ash observed by the human eye” and not deﬁned
quantitatively by the observer
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Meeting (2012) to further develop and co-ordinate
work related to volcanic ash risk mitigation. The
main approaches from these initiatives to be
implemented by the IAVW Operations Group are
set out chronologically in Table 2.
In essence, the Plan calls for the enhancement of
collaborative processes in the observation and
provision of information, better land and aircraft-
based volcano and ash observations, the introduc-
tion of conﬁdence levels to forecast information,
increased frequency of information, introduction of
probabilistic forecasts, and the introduction and use
of data on aircraft ash tolerances.
6 Conclusion
There is no doubt that future volcanic eruptions,
coupled with certain meteorological conditions,
have the potential to cause signiﬁcant disruptions
to air transport (Sammonds et al. 2011).
The ongoing development of the IAVWsystem
continues to reveal signiﬁcant challenges, some of
which may remain unresolved. Enacting a
ﬁt-for-purpose warning network that brings vol-
canic hazard warnings into the aircraft cockpit
requires the bridging of gaps between two sciences
(volcanology and meteorology) in order to
understand the hazard, to knit the operational parts
of those sciences together in a single warning
system, and then to connect with operations in the
time and resource-critical aviation industry.
Fortunately, and arguably due in large part to the
IAVW system, there have been no fatalities asso-
ciated with aircraft operations proximal to volcanic
ash clouds. However, where the eruption is forecast,
warned for, resulting volcanic ash clouds tracked,
and with communications procedures in place and
followed, experience shows that aircraft are still not
always able to avoid volcanic ash clouds. Naturally,
where science or communications cannot provide
usable information, the operational risk rises.
The objective remains to provide increasingly
granular and robust information that will allow
aircraft to operate, safely and economically, proxi-
mal to volcanic ash in the atmosphere. While much
has been achieved, there is more to do, in proce-
dures, science, engineering, and in practical
communications. Without good warning system
communications, fully informed by the social sci-
ences that assist in the ‘uptake’ of the message, and
by robust, reliable operational practices, the fruit of
science and policy development will remain
compromised.
Lastly, because the advent of the IAVW has
brought the meteorological and aviation communi-
ties much closer to the volcanological community,
there is an exciting opportunity to bring potentially
useful practices further into the combined geo-
physical hazards space. For example, volcanic tsu-
nami, lahar warnings, ash fall, and even rainfall
induced lava dome collapses, are all areas where the
twoﬁeldswill need towork togetherwell to produce
enhanced warning and communication services.
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